Close Combat in the Emerald Isles
With the British busy fighting World War I Sinn Fein launched their Easter Rising in 1916, but it resulted in just a week worth of fighting, no real gains, and the population of Dublin didn’t even support their efforts. If Irish nationalists wanted a free Ireland they were going to need new tactics and strategies if they wanted to win their fight. They would force Great Britain to change their tactics, and eventually come to the negations table, but not before plenty of bloody fighting. Through training, structure, and discipline the Irish volunteers would become the Irish Republican Army and accomplish many of their goals.
Going into the twentieth century the sun never set on the British Empire, but despite conquering so much of the globe Ireland remained it’s most troubled colony. The problem was the Irish had only really bruised the British who had no intention of pulling out, but that was about to change, because of a new Irish leader. Michael Collins was the president and director of intelligence of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and also held the rank of general. He survived the fighting during the last rebellion and knew all to well that he had to change how the volunteers and fresh recruits made war. He’d also develop an intelligence network which was active in not just gathering information, but also counter intelligence operations, and most importantly financing.
The British maintained control in Ireland through the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), which was made up largely of Irishmen, but unlike other British police forces they were armed to the teeth and operated more like a military than police organization. Collins took control of the local militias and in the years following the Easter Rising and political turmoil afterwards he took the fight to the British. He attacked police and military units and when he didn’t have arms he would attack police barracks and seize them. The guerrilla war went badly for the RIC and by 1919 it had more resignations and retirement requests than they had officers willing to fight.
Even though the fighting was going badly the British weren’t about to cut bait, and with plenty of veteran troops available they’d also change tactics. Prime Minister Lloyd George wasn’t about to negotiate with the “murder gang,” and instead sent reinforcements. Regular army troops were sent along with the Auxiliaries which were made up of veteran army officers, and the black and tans so named for their uniforms. Collins and his officers understood the threat right away, but the next wave of fighting would pit over 40,000 British against maybe 3,000 Irish fighters.
Fighting out in the country had IRA patrols ambushed and attacked British forces and pulled back while in the cities Collins and his commanders made their invaders feel unsafe where ever they went even in their own headquarters. If informants told the British where IRA men lived they’d be sought out and killed along with intelligence officers. To deal with the new threat the IRA Brigades became 100 man flying columns, and training camps were setup so when weapons became available men could join the fight. In this close combat fight the British did push back and they pushed back hard, but many times they over did it, and that began to turn neutral citizens into nationalists.
Anti-guerilla units that should have been hunting down IRA forces looted and terrorized citizens, and over time they would be ones looked on unfavorably by the press and the general public. By the summer of 1921 after intense fighting and executions of prisoners on both sides the British agreed to discuss a treaty, and while the Irish didn’t get everything they desired the treaty opened the door for goals to be met through peaceful means. While there is still fighting in Ireland there are lessons to be drawn from by both insurgents and regular military forces.
A low intensity conflict can be just as bad as more large scale actions, and commanders have to adapt if they want to win, and they can never lose the support of the people. While there are differences in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan some rules remain the same. The enemy has to be fought hard, and the people have to know that they’re supported. You can’t do that with jets and drones, it has to be done through working with the local people, and developing human intelligence. |